How likely is China's launch of a limited war against India? This is the question that has animated South Asia watchers over the last two days ever since reports about the Chinese denial of a visa to a top-ranking three-star Indian army general, whose operational command includes the state of Jammu and Kashmir, became public.

Notwithstanding the very animated media and cyber responses that have spewed on both sides of the Himalayas, as a defence analyst, I would aver that the probability of an actual shooting war, however limited — between the dragon and the elephant — is very, very low but this will not prevent their growling at each other as can be evidenced.

Kashmir and Tibet-Taiwan, though of different genealogy are a case in point.The question that is often raised among security experts is — what is the contour of the provocation that would compel the Asian giants to actually resort to military action?

Against each other, as for instance in the current fracas or a Sino-US confrontation say over Taiwan. These considerations have now moved out of the reclusive foreign office and security establishments in both China and India and civil society and the new netizen also stokes the debate in a palpable manner.

It is instructive that the question posed at the outset of this comment — how likely is China to launch a limited war — is from a Chinese daily, which in turn carried parts of a Forbes report (by two authors of Indian origin) and carried out a straw poll among its readers.

It is significant that at the time of writing this comment, the thumbs-down for this exigency — that China will or should launch a war — is 46 against 30 that gave a thumbs-up.

The inference that follows is that notwithstanding some shrill commentary and radical prescription in the more transparent and volatile Indian audio-visual medium, the immediate fallout and response from both governments has ranged from firm to muted and sabre-rattling is on hold.

This is to be cautiously welcomed and hopefully over the next few days, the politico-diplomatic channels will weigh in and bring the temperatures down.

Officially, both sides maintain that prevailing bilateral defence ties and relations have not been snapped or suspended and the foreign office in Beijing has formally stated, "…we are confident that both sides will stay focused on the broader picture of bilateral ties between our two countries, acting in a spirit of consultation and unity to promote the healthy development of military ties."

Two aspects of the current Chinese visa denial merit preliminary scrutiny. Clearly, the Indian government which has been dealing with the issue of Beijing issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K in a low visibility manner sees the current Chinese action as a case of raising the ante and pushing India on the status of J&K.

Post 1948, when the matter was referred to the U.N. by then Indian PM Nehru, the legal status of J&K is 'disputed' between India and Pakistan — the latter seen as the aggressor. While India is committed to the peaceful bilateral resolution of this dispute notwithstanding the revisionist wars that have been initiated by the Pakistan army, from 1965 to Kargil in 1999, till now the post Cold War Chinese stance was seen as neutral — particularly in the 1999 Kargil War.

So the first strand with strategic connotations is if Beijing is revising its policies in regard to all these complex and interlined territorial issues.

The second aspect is about China's current mix of national assertion and collective anxiety. Is the fact that China is now the world's second-largest economy encouraging the hardline/nationalist constituency to advocate a greater flexing of Beijing beef?

If so, this has been counter-productive, in that the creeping Chinese assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific maritime domain led to a face-off in Hanoi at the annual Asean Regional Forum (ARF) meeting where the rise of China is being perceived as far from 'peaceful'.

In the current visa denial episode, the view in India is that China's pronouncements about bridging the trust deficit and working towards peace and stability in keeping with the Jiang Zemin – Narasimha Rao 1993 protocols cannot be taken at face value.

The moot question thus is not about the limited war against India — but if the inexorable 'rise' of China is conducive to equitable peace and stability in Asia. The unease from East Asia to South Asia about the mismatch between Beijing's self-image and its actions needs little reiteration and should encourage objective introspection among China's accomplished but inscrutable intellectuals and academics.

(C. Uday Bhaskar is Director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi. The views expressed in this column are his own and do not represent those of Reuters).

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